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As academic and policy interest in climate geoengineering grows, the potential
irreversibility of technological developments in this domain has been raised as a
pressing concern. The literature on socio-technical lock-in and path dependence
is illuminating in helping to situate current concerns about climate geoengineer-
ing and irreversibility in the context of academic understandings of historical
socio-technical development and persistence. This literature provides a wealth
of material illustrating the pervasiveness of positive feedbacks of various types
(from the discursive to the material) leading to complex socio-technical entan-
glements which may resist change and become inﬂexible even in the light of
evidence of negative impacts.With regard to climate geoengineering, there are con-
cerns that geoengineering technologiesmight contribute so-called ‘carbon lock-in’,
or become irreversibly ‘locked-in’ themselves. In particular, the scale of infras-
tructures that geoengineering interventions would require, and the issue of the
so-called ‘termination effect’ have beendiscussed in these terms.Despite the emer-
gent and somewhat ill-deﬁned nature of the ﬁeld, some authors also suggest that
the extant framings of geoengineering in academic and policy literatures may
already demonstrate features recognizable as forms of cognitive lock-in, likely to
have profound implications for future developments in this area. While the con-
cepts of path-dependence and lock-in are the subject of ongoing academic critique,
by drawing analytical attention to these pervasive processes of positive feedback
and entanglement, this literature is highly relevant to current debates around
geoengineering. © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been growing academic1and policy interest in climate geoengineering—the
large scale, intentional manipulation of the earth’s cli-
mate system in order to attempt to counteract the
effects of anthropogenic climate change. Alongside
a number of other important policy issues, concerns
have been raised over the potential for geoengineer-
ing technologies to shore up current dependence on
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fossil fuels (so-called ‘carbon lock-in’2), or become
irreversibly entrenched or ‘locked-in’ themselves,3–5
becoming resistant to change even if negative impacts
were later discovered. In particular, the scale of infras-
tructures that geoengineering interventions would
require, and the issue of the so-called ‘termination
effect’6 (whereby the termination of a programme of
stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI) would result in
rapid heating of the planet) have been discussed in
these terms. Dynamics of ‘lock-in’ have been raised
even in relation to the more purely discursive aspects
of these challenges, where (despite the emergent and
somewhat ill-defined nature of the field), it has been
suggested that the extant framings of geoengineering
in academic and policy literatures may already demon-
strate features recognizable as forms of cognitive
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lock-in, likely to have profound implications for future
developments in this area.7
The wide ranging literature on path-dependence
and socio-technical lock-in is illuminating in help-
ing to situate current anxieties about irreversibil-
ity and climate geoengineering in the context of
academic understandings of historical socio-technical
developments and persistence. This review will pro-
vide a brief overview of the literature on lock-in
and path-dependence, highlighting a number of ongo-
ing theoretical debates and methodological challenges
associated with assessment of these processes; it will
then explore the way in which these concepts have
been invoked in the existing literature on climate
geoengineering. The article concludes with a critical
reflection on the potential of these conceptual frame-
works to contribute to a better understanding of dif-
ferent forms of irreversibility within the emerging dis-
courses and practices of climate geoengineering.
Theorizing Socio-Technical Development
and Persistence
Path-dependence and lock-in8–10 are concepts with
roots in evolutionary economics and the history
of technology, that are now widely used across a
range of social and political sciences11 to describe
and theorize the ways in which technologies, or
more broadly socio-technical systems,12 develop and
may become resistant to change. Path-dependence
refers, at the most basic level, to the fact that
‘history matters’ in understanding socio-technical
development. The original conceptualization of
path-dependence in the economics literature empha-
sized that path-dependent processes emerge initially
from contingent (chance, random) circumstances that
confer an initial advantage on a particular technology,
followed by self-reinforcing processes or positive feed-
back, such as cumulative cost reductions and learning
effects linked to increasing returns to adoption.8,13
Within path-dependent processes, the sequencing of
events is held to be particularly important, with earlier
events mattering more than those occurring later. As
Pierson puts it:
Specific patterns of timing and sequence matter; start-
ing from similar conditions, a wide range of social out-
comes may be possible; large consequences may result
from relatively "small" or contingent events; particu-
lar courses of action, once introduced, can be virtually
impossible to reverse.11
Lock-in is a way of conceptualizing the outcomes
of path-dependent processes, and describes how par-
ticular technologies—through their co-evolution
with social, institutional, cultural, and political
systems—may become resistant to change, ‘closing
down’ or constraining possibilities for the devel-
opment of alternative (possibly superior or more
socially/environmentally desirable) socio-technical
configurations. The potentially negative impacts of
technological lock-in—also sometimes referred to as
entrapment,14 or entrenchment9—include a host of
environmental and social problems such as climate
change, ecological degradation, resource depletion,
pollution, health and social problems. These impacts
which in general are only ‘belatedly discovered after
the system’ is well established.15 A classic example of
a ‘locked-in’ socio-technical regime is the transport
system based around the use of the private motor
car.16 As Shackley and Green explain:
the private car has had a profound influence on the
structure of the city and its surrounding region, but it
is no readily reversible effect as the mass availability of
the car becomes part and parcel of everyday lifestyles
and patterns of social and economic activity.17
Other paradigmatic examples of instances of
socio-technical lock-in accompanied by undesirable
impacts that are difficult to ameliorate, can be found
in the fossil fuel energy generation and distribution
system,2 nuclear industry,14,18 systems of industrial
agriculture,19 and urban infrastructures,20 such as
sewage systems.21
In addition to the aforementioned processes
such as cumulative cost reductions, identified in
the original economics literature on path-dependence
and lock-in, a growing body of work has identi-
fied a number of additional drivers and processes
linked to path-dependent outcomes. These include
cognitive or epistemic processes, such as the effects
of technological paradigms,22,23 the importance of
path-dependent processes in institutions,24–26 which
can range from legal systems27 to less rigidly defined
culturally accepted ‘ways of doing things’, or every-
day practices;21 and notions such as the ‘technological
regime’, defined as the ‘the whole complex of scientific
knowledges, engineering practices, production process
technologies, product characteristics, skills and proce-
dures, and institutions and infrastructures that make
up the totality of a technology’.28
Given that lock-in of particular socio-technical
configurations can act to constrain future choices in
profound ways, understanding path-dependent pro-
cesses and lock-in of different types has important
implications for democracy and social justice. For
example, it has been observed that the proximate
social forces shaping early configurations of arti-
facts and technologies (as well as routines, practices
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and paradigmatic ways of thinking) ‘typically reflect
the “needs” preferences, normativities and interests
of rather restricted social groups’,29 with the result
being that the diversity and direction of technological
change in areas as diverse as agriculture, pharmaceuti-
cals, energy, the military, and communication, has his-
torically been constrained by powerful socioeconomic
and institutional-political pressures.
Maintenance of the social control of technol-
ogy and the prevention or amelioration of negative
impacts of technological development are the norma-
tive concerns of the broad field of technology assess-
ment (TA). Much work in this area builds on the work
of Collingridge,9 who famously described the question
of societal control over technological development in
terms of a ‘dilemma’ whereby in the early stages of
a technology’s development while the technology is
still relatively easy to control, the impacts of tech-
nologies are largely unpredictable/unknowable; but by
the time impacts are known, control is often impossi-
ble or very difficult. Collingridge argued that mainte-
nance of flexibility in the face of unpredictability was
a means of mitigating the negative impacts associated
with lock-in, and that ‘the essence of controlling a
technology [was] not in forecasting its social conse-
quences, but in retaining the ability to change a tech-
nology, even when it is fully developed and diffused’.9
It has been observed that lock-in of a particular
technology is likely to imply ‘lock-out’ of others,30 and
hence the erosion of diversity,29 which may happen
by chance, or through the deliberate actions of advo-
cates for particular technologies.14 Hence, it has been
suggested that one way in which flexibility can be sus-
tained (and damaging lock-in avoided) is through the
maintenance of diversity.14,15,29 For example, Walker’s
case study of the nuclear re-processing industry pro-
vides evidence of the negative effects of a loss of diver-
sity leading to entrapment, and for the need to ‘ensure
that alternatives survive and develop, that switching
costs are not held unnaturally high, and that extrica-
tion is given due and timely attention’.14
Socio-Technical Lock-In and
Climate Geoengineering
The term ‘lock-in’ features relatively prominently in
the academic and policy discourse around climate geo-
engineering to date. However, reflecting its diverse
usage in the broader academic literature, exactly what
is meant by the term is not necessarily consistent,
and it has been invoked to refer to a number of dif-
ferent processes or give voice to a number of dif-
ferent kinds of concerns. Within the academic and
policy literature on geoengineering, two broad levels
of analysis can be discerned: a focus on particular
technologies or classes of technology and the poten-
tial mechanisms and consequences of lock-in that
might result from their development and deployment;
and a focus on the broader context of existing fos-
sil fuel dependence or so-called ‘carbon lock-in’, and
the ways in which particular technologies might dis-
rupt or reinforce this. In the former category, the issue
of socio-technical lock-in has been cited as a policy
concern in a number of high-profile reports on geo-
engineering, including the Royal Society Report,4 the
UK House of Commons report on the Regulation of
Geoengineering,31 and the 2012 report by the Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity.3 The need for assessment
of the risk of lock-in was also a component of one of
the so-called ‘Oxford Principles’ for the governance of
geoengineering.5 Some authors5 distinguish between
technical and social lock-in: technical lock-in being
used to refer to the kinds of commitments that would
accompany particular technological approaches such
as SAI due to the existence of the so-called ‘termina-
tion effect’. The term is used to refer to the fact that if
a programme of Stratospheric Aerosol Injection were
implemented but then discontinued, there would be
a rapid spike in global temperature that would likely
be more damaging than the more gradual temperature
increases that would have taken place in the absence
of such an intervention,6 hence societies would be
‘locked-in’ to continuing the activity. Social lock-in,
in this case, is used to refer to the ways in which
many of the proposed technologies [e.g., direct air cap-
ture (DAC)], would be dependent on the existence of
a highly capital-intensive physical infrastructure, the
large sunk costs in which would create vested inter-
ests in keeping facilities operational, and hence would
lead to various types of inertia and lock-in.32
On the other hand, the term lock-in has also
been used to highlight the perceived risk of forms
of regulatory lock-in to particular commitments (e.g.,
a total ban on testing), that might be regretted or
have unintended consequences in limiting possible
responses to emergency climate change.33
Other work has drawn attention to the impor-
tance of framing effects and what could be called
‘cognitive lock-in’. For example, Bellamy et al. carried
out a review of appraisals of geoengineering meth-
ods. They highlight the ways in which instrumental
framing effects impact on the outcome of appraisals in
important ways, acting to promote apparently prefer-
able decision options given those framing effects that
are privileged. In particular they illustrate the impact
on outcomes of the choice of contextual problem
frame within which appraisal of geoengineering takes
place (e.g., the idea of climate emergency or the failure
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of mitigation), the choice of appraisal methods applied
(e.g., the use of expert-analytic methods such as com-
putermodeling, economic assessment and expert opin-
ions), and the particular options appraised (e.g., the
choice to focus on a limited number of geoengineer-
ing options, or to compare geoengineering options in
contextual isolation rather than with the wider port-
folio of responses to climate change). They draw on
the concept of lock-in to argue that:
As an upstream suite of technology proposals, [geo-
engineering proposals] are particularly sensitive
to… instrumental framing effects and could easily be
quickly and prematurely closed down, locking us in
to certain technological trajectories but not others …
potentially unsung divergent values and interests in
such a lock-in could cause controversy.7
In a related vein, work on ‘upstream’ public
engagement has highlighted the ethical concern that
‘the very act of studying and engaging with geoengi-
neering could generate a momentum of its own—an
intellectual ‘lock-in’—that might also have a dramatic
impact’.34 This is related to the so-called ‘slippery
slope’ argument35–38 that ‘even very basic and safe
research … could be a first step onto a ‘slippery slope’
toward deployment’,39 or might act to lock-in some
options to the detriment of other possible options.40
Conversely, the oft-cited argument in favor of
research is that without it,
if andwhen geoengineering becomes necessary, wewill
lack knowledge about which approaches are more or
less effective and more or less dangerous. So there will
be a greater chance that geoengineering efforts will fail
or cause serious collateral damage.41
However, the implication that research is a neu-
tral activity has been critiqued. For example Jamieson
draws attention to what he calls the ‘cultural imper-
ative’ that holds that if something can be done it
should be done, and suggests that this often results
in technologies developing ‘a life of their own that
leads inexorably to their development and deploy-
ment’. He draws on the history of medical research
to suggests that one of the central reasons for this is
that ‘[a] research program often creates a community
of researchers that functions as an interest group pro-
moting the development of the technology that they
are investigating’.36 The report on geoengineering by
the US Congressional Research Service made a similar
point, by highlighting the fact that ‘[i]nnovative and
entrepreneurial organizations seldom mobilize them-
selves to put complex technologies “on the shelf”’,42
which may result in a the premature and possibly
dangerous promotion and deployment of particular
technologies. Similarly a recent report from the Yale
Climate and Energy Institute highlighted similar con-
cerns around the slippery slope by pointing to the
‘propensity for technologies to be developed once con-
ceived of, and then used once developed’.38 Another
facet of this idea of a ‘slippery slope’ is the idea
that both research and broader civil society or public
engagement with geoengineering might have a (dan-
gerous) ‘normalizing’ effect. A recent article in the
Huffington post argued that:
This insistence that we engage in debate over climate
geoengineering is part of the process of "normaliza-
tion" that seems orchestrated – perhaps deliberately –
with the intent of habituating people to the whole idea
of climate geoengineering as an option.43
Another area of growing interest to assessment
of geoengineering, is the role that intellectual prop-
erty (IP) might play in shaping the development of
these technologies.44 Although not specifically refer-
ring to the terminology of ‘lock-in’, Parthasarathy
et al. argue that ‘in the absence of any significant reg-
ulatory framework, the patent system has become the
de facto method of controlling technological develop-
ment’ (p. 7), and suggest that this is likely to shape its
development in profound and irreversible ways. They
find that in the field of geoengineering,
‘while relatively few patents have been granted to
date, certain trends – including the provision of broad
patent language, dramatically increasing numbers of
applications, and the concentration of patent owner-
ship – suggest that patents will play an important role
in how this technology develops’. (p. 3)
As well as the abovementioned work which
is concerned with the various processes that might
impact on the future development (and potential
lock-in) of proposed geoengineering technologies, the
concept of lock-in also features as descriptive of the
broader context within which these geoengineering
interventions are being discussed—for example, the
idea that the world is currently ‘locked in to the
highest emissions trajectory envisaged by the IPCC’.45
The concept of carbon lock-in2,46 has been used to
describe the apparent inertia in industrialized highly
carbon dependent economies due to the stability of
the techno-institutional complexes responsible for the
bulk of carbon emissions (encompassing both physical
infrastructure and social and cultural practices and
institutions). Some geoengineering technologies such
as DAC have been examined within the context
of carbon lock-in, and it has been suggested that
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these technologies may ‘exacerbate carbon-based path
dependency and intensify the lock-in of fossil fuels in
the near term’.46 This might also act to ‘lock-out’ other
technologies. Potentially relevant to understanding
the types of lock-in processes associated with certain
geoengineering technologies is the literature on carbon
capture and storage (CCS). For example it has been
argued that lock-in of CCS might contribute to fossil
fuel lock-in (albeit low carbon), and to a process of
lock-out of renewable alternatives.47,48
Conversely, geoengineering is seen by some as a
way of ‘unlocking the mitigation puzzle’ and provid-
ing a way out of what is seen to be a gridlock. Allenby,
for example, has suggested that the UNFCCC process
itself is a form of ‘cultural lock-in’,49 with existing
policy structures (however ineffectual) being unlikely
to change because of the institutional and psycholog-
ical commitments of the participants to the process,
and that geoengineering can best be understood as
a response to this lock-in. It is interesting then that
existing carbon lock-in may well form the basis of an
argument both for and against geoengineering, as has
occurred in arguments for and against CCS.50
Likely as a result of their relatively more devel-
oped status, carbon-based geoengineering techniques
such as bio-energy with carbon capture and stor-
age (BECCS) have been examined in more detail
than solar radiation management methods, particu-
larly with relation to possible impacts on fossil fuel
lock-in,51,52 and there is potentially relevant litera-
ture for some carbon based geoengineering techniques
to be found in literature on mechanisms of lock-in
around CCS.48,53 It is notable that some of this empir-
ical work on CCS actually suggests that
there is little evidence at the current time that CCS is
‘crowding-out’ the alternatives, and it may even be a
factor in realising some of those alternatives through
sharing underlying technologies. This would suggest
that the risk of low-carbon lock-in may be relatively
modest.48
The concept of lock-in has also featured in
debates around biochar, with disagreement appar-
ent about the degree to which biochar should be
considered a ‘disruptive technology’54 to incumbent
political economic regimes locked into unsustainable
pathways, or whether the promotion of biochar and
its linkage into carbon markets, might itself result in
‘lock-in to routes and styles that favor scale and profit
at the expense of local livelihoods and landscapes’.55
Ongoing Theoretical Debates
Although the concepts of lock-in and path-dependence
have proven useful across a range of disciplines, and
are invoked widely within the emerging discussions of
geoengineering, there are a number of ongoing areas
of debate and contention, and the degree to which
path-dependence is understood to constitute a theory
is contested.56 In particular, gathering empirical data
about past technological developments to support
the theory of path-dependence is problematic, with
critics highlighting the difficulty of being able to
prove the counterfactual,57 i.e., the impossibility of
gathering empirical material to draw a comparison
‘between the current state of the world and what the
world would now be like had a different path been
followed’.19 Indeed it has been argued that ‘[i]n most
case study research, path dependence theory is simply
unfalsifiable.’58
It has also been argued that the original path
dependence explanation for the persistence of partic-
ular sub-optimal solutions may be ‘too simple, too
generic’59 to contribute greatly to understanding per-
sistence in other areas (e.g., public policy), and that
other explanations such as first-mover advantage or
organizational inertia may be equally or better able to
explain persistence.58
The issue of the suboptimality or otherwise
of path-dependent outcomes is also the subject of
long standing academic debate10,13,60 often fuelled,
it has been claimed,61 by ideological differences. As
Arthur argues, the debate about the suboptimality or
otherwise of the QWERTY keyboard design (widely
cited as the paradigmatic case of path-dependence
resulting in lock-in) is not so much about keyboards,
but the ideological belief in the power of markets to
produce an optimal outcome.61 Importantly, although
much literature has focused on negative outcomes
resulting from lock-in, and how it can be avoided, it
is also the case that a degree of lock-in is, in many
cases unavoidable, and need not always carry negative
connotations. As Walker points out:
In complex fields of technology, commitments can
become— and have to become—multifarious, exten-
sive and entangling. Otherwise, nothing can happen.
This gives rise to an unavoidable predicament: the very
act of ‘digging in’ commitments makes societies and
their institutions vulnerable to entrapment. Not only
does ‘lock-in’ exist, it is an essential but dangerous
facet of complex infrastructural innovation.14
Given the necessity and inevitability of some
degree of socio-technical entanglement or lock-in,
Shackley et al. have argued for a differentiation of the
concept from deep to shallow lock-in. As they put it:
lock-in per se is not the problem; it is rather the depth
of lock-in which creates problems because deeper
Volume 5, September/October 2014 © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 653
Advanced Review wires.wiley.com/climatechange
lock-in reduces flexibility and increases the ‘error cost’
(i.e. the cost of a decision which turns out to be based
on incorrect understanding) and should be avoided.48
Similarly Stirling refers to a ‘milder, more rou-
tine’ form of lock or ‘momentum’ consisting of ‘com-
plex networks of technical, operational, financial,
regulatory, educational, cultural, and behavioral fac-
tors’ and points out that this is generally seen as
an essential element in the successful development
of new technologies.62 Indeed, the idea of ‘strategic
niche management’63 aimed at helping to induce a
socio-technical transition toward sustainability, can
be thought of as the process of achieving a desired
end by attempting to facilitate a degree of lock-in
around a desired novel technology through the pro-
tection of a niche in which it can develop. In other
words, by ‘creating a little bit of irreversibility in the
right direction’.28
Despite the permanence implied by the metaphor
of lock-in, various debates have highlighted that the
term ‘lock-in’ should not be taken too literally, and
cannot be understood as a permanent condition.64
For example some authors have highlighted that one’s
view on whether a technology is ‘locked in’ depends
substantially on the timescale over which one exam-
ines the process. Vergne and Durand thus suggest that
arguably ‘history did not matter’ in the oft cited bat-
tle between VHS and Betamax because in the long
run both became obsolete, giving way to the use
of DVDs.56 A conceptualization that usefully serves
to emphasize processes (rather than the static state
suggested by the term ‘lock-in’) is that of ‘emerg-
ing irreversibilities’.28,65 These can be thought of as
socio-technical entanglements which over time enable
and constrain alignments and activities of persons,
institutions, and artifacts.
Debate also surrounds the role of contingency
versus the agency of actors in path-dependent pro-
cesses or lock-in.56,66 For example, Garud et al.,
argue against what they see as fatalistic notions of
agency implicit in the commonly applied versions of
path-dependence in which ‘actors become ‘locked-in’
by self-reinforcing mechanisms into paths whose evo-
lution is determined by contingencies (chance events).
Once locked in, actors cannot break out unless
exogenous shocks occur’.66 However, they also argue
that the ‘heroic’ notion of agency found in more
entrepreneurial models in which ‘actors are driven
by ‘a logic of control’ to effectuate through complex
processes’ is also inappropriate. This has led these
authors to coin the term ‘path creation’ (rather than
path-dependence), in which agency is theorized as
‘being distributed and emergent through the interac-
tions of actors and artifacts that constitute action nets’
(p. 761). Similarly, Ebbinghaus67 has suggested the
need to move beyond what he considers to be overly
‘deterministic and inflexible’ understandings of path
dependence, in favor of a more developmental under-
standing of path dependence as structuring of choices
that provides a basis for theorizing not just stabiliza-
tion and inertia, but also the potential for what he calls
‘path departure’ and institutional change.
Simplistic notions of a linear progression from
early to late development of a technology, as it passes
through defined stages of path-dependence through
to lock-in, have also been questioned. For example,
Liebert and Schmidt68 argue that ‘there is no linear
time ordering as presupposed by the dilemma (formu-
lated by Collingridge) and its classic linear innova-
tion theory’. They go on to suggest then that although
‘the temporal dimension of Collingridge’s dilemma
might actually exist… the processes are significantly
more multi-faceted, non-linear, complex and inter-
active than the dilemma presupposes’ (p. 67). Oth-
ers have critiqued the notion of the existence of a
‘right time’ to influence technological development. As
Nordmann puts it, ‘[t]o consider this as a dilemma
is tantamount to viewing the present as an obstacle
that can and needs to be overcome’.69 Similarly, Garud
et al. have highlighted that ‘starting points’ for anal-
ysis of path-dependent processes are not self-evident
because ‘the past, present and the future are inter-
twined, with actors playing an active role in deter-
mining what portions of the past they would like to
mobilize in support of their imagined futures’.66
Technological Assessment: Generic
Methodological Challenges
Although in an important sense, all technological
assessment shares a concern for possible future
impacts of socio-technical development, future
states are open to change and are in many cases
unknowable.68 This unpredictability of the future led
to Collingridge himself denouncing what he called the
‘predictionist approach’ (the idea that what is needed
to avoid damaging lock-in is simply better forecasting
tools), saying that this was a misconception of the
problem, since ‘harmful effects of a technology can
be identified only after it has been developed and has
diffused’ and ‘a whole bundle of unknown factors’
will remain.9 Similarly, Guston and Sarewitz refer to
what they call a ‘central truth’ about the development
and proliferation of technology in society, namely
‘that this process is largely unpredictable, and thus
not subject to anticipatory governance’.70 They go
on to argue that although predicting the social con-
sequences of a technology might be desirable, this
goal:
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will never be fully attained, because consequences
emerge not from the static attributes of a fully formed
technology, but from the complex co-production that
simultaneously and continually moulds both technol-
ogy and social context.70
Given the challenge of future prediction, there
are a number of methodologies that focus analysis on
the present moment (e.g., analysis of the expectations
or visions of those people working to develop the
technologies in question, or the application of generic
sets of indicators to assess a given technology or idea);
or look to historical analogs to understand possible
parallels. For example, various authors have used
indicators of flexibility to assess the likelihood or
otherwise of a given technology becoming ‘locked-in.’
Shackley and Thompson argue that:
[t]echnological (in)flexibility can … be used as a
proxy measure of low (high) lock-in. The crucial idea
here is that, although lock-in is unavoidable (and
necessary), we can do something about the depth
of that lock-in; the more flexible are the constituent
technologies, the shallower is the lock-in.48
Collingridge developed a number of indicators
of flexibility9,71 including high capital intensity, long
lead-time from conception to realization, large scale
of the production unit relative to the sector, major
infrastructure requirements, exaggerated claims about
performance, and hubris. He argued that the more of
these indicators that are present with regard to a spe-
cific technology, the more cautious society should be
in committing to adoption of that technology. Oth-
ers have amended or added to this list, for example,
Shackley and Thompson also add a number of what
they refer to as ‘organization indicators’, including
closure to criticism and ‘single mission outfits’.48 Sim-
ilarly the Royal Commission on Environmental Pol-
lution’s report on nanotechnology72 makes use of
Collingridge’s indicators, and adds an additional indi-
cator of irreversibility in the form of whether or not
a technology involves the uncontrolled release of sub-
stances into the environment.
While the use of indicators has been usefully
applied, one critique of this approach is that—aside
from the implicit normative desirability of corrigibility
or flexibility in socio-technical development—there is
little room for a consideration of what might be con-
sidered socially desirable directions for change. This
is a generic challenge to the assessment of processes
of path-dependence and lock-in, namely, that while
this kind of TA is usually understood as being an
explicitly normative project,9 in that it represents an
attempt to ‘anticipate and ameliorate the down-side
impacts of human interventions’,70 work in this area
soon encounters the issue that values are not always
shared. It is not always the case that ‘an unambigu-
ous set of societal goals can be enunciated’.28 Diverse
(sometimes contradictory) goals will be present in any
given society at a given moment in time. Indeed tech-
nological developments may even change the soci-
etal norms by which their impacts are to be judged,
they can ‘transform our very conception of human
beings, human flourishing, and of the proper rela-
tionship between human beings and nature’.73 Given
that multiple values and different visions of desired
futures exist, there are multiple possible directions
for what constitutes desirable technological ‘progress.’
For example, as Brown puts it:
The future – and its associated meta-concept of
‘progress’ – emerge through an unstable field of
language, practice and materiality in which different
groups compete for the right to represent near and far
term developments. And like any other contested field,
actors engage in such struggles with unequal access to
the resources with which futures are manufactured.74
These issues raise fundamental questions about
the role of assessment. Traditionally, much TA has
focused primarily on the notion of risk, utilizing
expert-led analytical methods such as cost-benefit
analysis, and risk assessment. However, the inade-
quacy of these approaches to determining the desir-
ability of a given direction of development, or for
operating in situations of uncertainty, ignorance or
ambiguity, has been the subject of sustained academic
critique. For example Stirling argues:
Where there exist divergent socio-political interests
and values, it is a fundamental finding in axiomatic
rational choice theory that there cannot exist – even
in principle – any purely analytical means defini-
tively to reconcile the resulting contrasting prefer-
ence orderings…This refutes the value of the aggre-
gated quantitative results routinely produced in social
appraisal by methods like cost benefit analysis, risk
assessment and decision theory.29
An overly narrow conceptualization of technol-
ogy as separate from society has also been the subject
of critique which has drawn attention to the hybrid
characteristics of technology, incorporating social and
discursive elements, and of the importance of social
deliberation around the form and direction that tech-
nologies take, rather than simply making efforts to
minimize impacts. As Macnaghten and colleagues
point out, often:
the academic literature has framed technology as
‘black-boxed’ and well-defined, with an independent
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asocial logic that results in ‘impacts’ or ‘effects’. Social
questions are often narrowly framed as ‘impacts’ or
‘risk’ issues, placing the site of social science inquiry
firmly ‘downstream’ of innovation processes.75
As a result of this awareness of the social charac-
ter of technology, the plurality of potential directions
of ‘progress’ and the profound implications for society
and democracy of the choosing of particular develop-
ment paths over others, there has been a turn to greater
transparency and reflexivity in processes of TA as evi-
denced by the development of approaches such as ‘real
time TA’,70 ‘constructive TA’,76 and ‘participatory
TA’.77 An important component of these approaches is
the need for assessment to be engaged at an ‘upstream’
moment69,75 rather than simply considering down-
stream ‘impacts’, and to examine the different kinds
of visions of the future embedded in particular ideas
about emerging technologies, an endeavor sometimes
referred to as vision or expectation assessment,78,79 or
the ‘forensics of wishing’.69
Technological Assessment:
Geoengineering-Specific Challenges
A number of large multi-partner, multi-disciplinary
projects are currently underway with the remit of
assessing geoengineering proposals, including the
Integrated Assessment of Geoengineering Propos-
als (IAGP) and the European Transdisciplinary
Assessment of Climate Engineering (EUTrace), and
a growing body of work relevant to the assess-
ment of potential processes of socio-technical
entanglement—or lock-in—and geoengineering
exists. This work includes efforts to trace the his-
torical emergence of the field,80,81 and to map out the
current extent of work in this area,1 or to explore
possible future scenarios in which geoengineering
technologies feature.38 In addition to the generic
challenges of TA and the study of processes of lock-in
outlined above, there are a number of characteristics
that make assessment of geoengineering particularly
challenging. This include the difficulties posed by the
inherent ambiguity of the term geoengineering; the
diversity of technologies that are currently discussed
using this terminology and the different ways in which
various actors have attempted to categorize these; and
the variety of extant framings of geoengineering.
For example, while many authors refer to the
Royal Society definition of geoengineering as the
‘deliberate large-scale intervention in the Earth’s cli-
mate system, in order to moderate global warming’,4
the term is still contested, with some authors suggest-
ing that the term is too ambiguous,82 or that other
terms such as ‘climate remediation’83,84 or ‘climate
management’85 might be more appropriate. The diver-
sity of approaches subsumed within the umbrella term
‘geoengineering’ likewise raises significant issues for
any assessment of the potential for lock-in. This has
led to calls for the term to be disaggregated,86 and
for different approaches to be analyzed individually,37
or to attempts to group approaches into particu-
lar types—such as the much-used Solar Radiation
Management (SRM)/Carbon dioxide Removal (CDR)
distinction4—and for analysis to be carried out with
regard to these categories. Rayner has suggested that
the CDR/SRM taxonomy could be improved by dis-
tinguishing techniques involving so-called ‘ecosystems
enhancement’ from those described as ‘blackbox engi-
neering.’ The former refers to technologies that ‘stim-
ulate or enhance natural processes’45 such as ocean
iron fertilization or SAI, while the latter refers to tech-
niques such as DAC or space mirrors. Another classi-
ficatory system draws an ethical distinction between
approaches which attempt to remediate or clean up
damages, such as DAC (labeled as ‘geo-remediation’),
and those which aim at ‘steering around or repair-
ing anticipated damages’, such as SAI, labeled as
‘geo-steering’.87
The variety of different classificatory systems
indicates that no one typology can be considered
final or absolute. These struggles around the naming
and typologizing of a field are about more than just
semantics, and much work in the social and political
sciences has emphasized the fact that the act of naming
is an important way in which power operates.88,89
With regard to the naming of an academic discipline
or field, work examining the emergence of distinctive
fields of ‘nanotechnology’,90 and ‘synthetic biology’91
has shown that the act of naming is crucial to the
coming together of a ‘community of practice’92 in a
particular domain. This delimitation of a named field
has important material and political consequences,
in that it ‘renders more visible, more powerful, and
increases the potential to attract funding for, certain
forms of work’.91 Existing, previously unconnected
research trajectories may then engage with the new
label in different ways—either actively seeking to be
incorporated or asserting distinctiveness. In the case
of geoengineering, existing research in diverse areas
such as climate modeling, cloud physics, aerosols,
forestry, or soil science might, from particular vantage
points be considered ‘geoengineering research’, but the
cohesiveness of a singular ‘field’ cannot be assumed.
This serves to highlight the problematic nature of
assessing geoengineering as a category, and indeed
underscores the potential for uncritical assessment to
act to reify its object, resulting in geoengineering being
framed as a singular technology or set of technologies,
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rather than a very heterogeneous set of discourses,
practices, and forms of knowledge. As has been argued
to be the case for assessments of biotechnology, there
is thus a need for assessment of geoengineering to
engage critically with the term itself, to decenter the
analysis.93
An important part of this process of engaging
critically with the label of geoengineering is discourse
analytical work examining the framings of geoengi-
neering. A number of such studies have been carried
out, highlighting the important ways in which fram-
ings are emerging (or being used strategically) and
impacting on the development of geoengineering as
a distinctive ‘field’.7,94–99 Bellamy et al. in particu-
lar have illustrated the ways in which the framing
of assessment and appraisal themselves are power-
ful ways in which particular processes of ‘cognitive
lock in’ might occur, and draw attention to the way
in which many assessments of geoengineering to date
have created an artificial choice between technologies
by focusing on these approaches in contextual isola-
tion, rather than in the context of the wider portfolio
of options for tackling climate change.
The existence of diverse framings of geoengineer-
ing is related to the existence of diverse societal val-
ues in this domain. As mentioned, all TA faces the
challenge of incorporating and responding to diverse
societal goals and values, and this issue is particu-
larly relevant to the appraisal of geoengineering tech-
nologies, and ties into broader debates about the role
of technological assessment and appraisal itself – i.e.
that it needs to be participatory, deliberative, reflex-
ive, embedded, and so on in order to be able to reflect
these pluralities and indeed to avoid reinforcing par-
ticular path dependent processes. The elicitation and
incorporation of public views and perceptions of geo-
engineering into governance arrangements is clearly
crucially important for any assessment process,100–103
and yet the very act of engaging publics with the topic
of geoengineering is, itself fraught with potential for
feeding into path-dependent processes.
The process of ‘decentering’ the assessment of
geoengineering also has a temporal dimension. For
example, historical work on weather and climate
modification has illustrated that the supposed nov-
elty of geoengineering does not always stand up to
scrutiny,80,81 but is rather best understood as the latest
manifestation in a long history of attempts to con-
trol the climate. With regard to the study of potential
lock-in, the idea that humanity is currently at the fron-
tier of technological development or at an ‘upstream’
stage, and even the idea of assessing potential lock-in
in the future might reinforce this idea of novelty, or
act to obscure certain lessons from history. It is also
the case that although many of the schemes being dis-
cussed have not been attempted to date, history is
replete with example of socio-technical developments
in other areas that might be relevant to understand-
ing possible patterns of development in geoengineer-
ing. The use of historical analogs to examine possible
social patterns of responses to technological innova-
tion has been carried out with regard to a number
of technologies.104 Clearly, the choice of analog in
any given case is crucial: as Walker points out, gen-
eralization from particular historical cases of tech-
nological development should be approached ‘with
caution as the histories of all technologies are sui
generis in considerable degree where there is great
complexity’.14 With regard to geoengineering, a num-
ber of analogs have been suggested, including nan-
otechnology, molecular biology, and nuclear science,42
ecological analogies such as the use of biological
control,105 or human interventions in other natural
cycles such as the nitrogen cycle.106 While some work
in this field has been carried out, the use of analogs to
better understand the likely social processes at work
in different kinds of geoengineering interventions is
likely to be helpful. However it may also be the case
that there simply are no historical analogs for some
of the proposed climate geoengineering approaches,
and indeed somemay necessitate newways of thinking
and talking about irreversibility. For example, various
authors have highlighted that geoengineering through
SAI would require extremely long-term commitments
in order to function effectively and avoid the rapid
heating that would accompany cessation of the pro-
gramme (the termination effect). However, the use of
the term ‘lock-in’ to describe this situation (see for e.g.,
Ref 5), expands its usage beyond that which appears
in the existing literature, by implicating dimensions of
lock-in that are exceptionally extensive and diverse.
For example, there appears to be nothing in the canon-
ical examples of lock-in such as nuclear reactors, auto-
mobile transport or the QWERTY keyboard design,
that resembles the manner and scale of the implica-
tion of natural system processes as those postulated
in the ‘termination effect,’ the existence of which has
been referred to as leaving the entire earth system vul-
nerable to ‘technological failure’.107
CONCLUSION
Given the growth in academic and policy interest in
geoengineering, and the profound and (by definition)
global scale implications of many of the interventions
being discussed in these terms, consideration of
potential emerging irreversibilities of various types
is timely and crucial. The extensive literature on
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socio-technical lock-in and path dependence provides
an important set of theoretical concepts, empirical
examples, and methodological approaches that can
be helpful in contextualizing contemporary concerns
about geoengineering within broader understand-
ings of socio-technical development. This literature
provides a wealth of material illustrating the per-
vasiveness of positive feedbacks of various types
(from the discursive to the material) leading to com-
plex socio-technical entanglements which may resist
change and become inflexible even in the light of
evidence of negative impacts. However, it is also the
case that ongoing academic debates have highlighted a
number of limitations to the uncritical usage of the ter-
minology of lock-in and path dependence.With regard
to path-dependence, critiques include issues around
the falsifiability or otherwise of path dependence as a
theory and contentions around the suboptimality or
otherwise of path-dependent outcomes. With regard
to the terminology of ‘lock-in’, the exceptionalist and
largely negative connotation of the term, may act to
obscure the more pervasive/unavoidable and often
positive nature of socio-technical entanglements of
various types.
With regard to assessment, the literature pro-
vides a set of methodological tools (such as the use of
indicators of flexibility, expectation and vision assess-
ment, and the use of historical analogs) which may
prove useful in helping societies to think through pos-
sible implications of continued research and develop-
ment in this controversial area. However, processes of
assessment also run the risk of reifying their object,
and due attention must be paid to ways in which
any assessment can ‘decenter’ analysis through pay-
ing due attention to framing effects. Finally, there
may be forms of geoengineering, such as SAI, which
(through their implication of natural system processes
in the form of the ‘termination effect’) require fun-
damentally new ways of thinking and talking about
irreversibility.
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